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Questions Presented for Review 
Question No. 1: Is it the public policy of the State of Utah to permit a Petitioner 
who prevails at the trial on the merits and accepts payment in full of judgment but then 
fails to file a satisfaction of judgment to continue to appeal the trial court's decision? 
Question No. 2: May a party prosecute a cause of action to establish a marriage 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §30-1-4.5, when the period of cohabitation terminated 
more than one year prior to the commencement of the action? 
Reference to Court of Appeals Decision 
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in this matter on October 29, 2009. 
Statement of Grounds on Which Jurisdiction is Based 
This Court should exercise its jurisdiction because the Court of Appeals rendered a 
decision regarding the right to continue to maintain an appeal which has so far departed 
from what should be the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for 
this Court to exercise its supervisory authority in order to establish a clear demarcation of 
the public policy of this State concerning both the mandates of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as well as the interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions. The 
foregoing statement of grounds is applicable to both of the questions presented. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state law 
which has not previously been settled which should be settled by the Supreme Court. 
This statement of ground is applicable to both questions presented but most importantly 
to the issue of cohabitation in the context of a claim to establish a common law marriage. 
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Further, this issue is of importance to both the trial bench ^nd the bar, extending 
substantially beyond the mere facts of the instant action. 
Controlling Rules and Statutory Provisions 
A. Utah Code Provisions 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and 
valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract 
between a man and a woman who: 
(a) are of legal age and capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this 
section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within 
one year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved 
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in pther cases. 
B. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment ltnay be satisfied, in whole or in 
part, as to any or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, or by the 
attorney of record of the judgment creditor where no assignment of the judgment 
has been filed and such attorney executes such satisfaction within eight years after 
the entry of the judgment, in the following manner (1) by written instrument, duly 
acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of such 
satisfaction signed by the owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with jhe date affixed and witnessed 
by the clerk. Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more of 
the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid thereon or for the release of such 
debtors, naming them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgmeiit shall have been fully paid and 
not satisfied of record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall have been lost, 
the court in which such judgment was recovered may, upon motion and 
satisfactory proof, authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to satisfy the 
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same, or may enter an order declaring the same satisfied and direct satisfaction to 
be entered upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction of judgment, duly executed and 
acknowledged, the clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, and enter it 
on the register of actions. He shall also enter a brief statement of the substance 
thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the judgment docket, with the 
date of filing of such satisfaction. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall have been satisfied, in whole or 
in part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon the docket 
by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such satisfaction, be discharged 
and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execution shall 
thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution shall be endorsed with a 
memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to collect only 
the residue thereof, or to collect only from the judgment debtors remaining liable 
thereon., 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction of a 
judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the county where 
such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or a 
certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with the clerk of 
the district court in any other county where the judgment may have been docketed. 
Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be made by the clerk of 
such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as in the county where the 
same was originally entered. 
Statement of the Case 
The instant action was to establish the validity of an unsolemnized marriage, for 
the entry of a decree of divorce, and claims' for unjust enrichment. At the trial court, 
Brown filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the petition to establish an 
unsolemnized marriage was untimely. The motion for partial summary judgment was 
granted based upon the passage of in excess of one year since the parties cohabitated and 
the filing of the original action. Subsequently, a trial was held where the Court found 
Brown was unjustly enriched based on capital improvements to a home she owned prior 
to her relationship with Richards. After entry of the judgment, Brown paid the judgment 
in full, however Richards failed to file a satisfaction of judgment. Richards appealed and 
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the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. I Specifically, the Court of 
Appeals reversed deciding the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the motion 
for summary judgment holding the element "have cohabited" should be treated 
differently than the other elements required to prove an unsolemnized marriage because 
that element is written in the past tense in contrast to the present tense of the majority of 
the other elements of UCA §30-1-4.5. Brown petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari 
on two issues which petition was granted. 
Statement of Facts 
Richards commenced this action by filing a Verified Petition for Paternity and 
Related Matters on December 21, 2006. (R. 1-8). In the \| 
and Related Matters, Richards alleged in the relevant part: 
married (R. 1); the parties continually resided together for 
(erified Petition for Paternity 
the parties had never been 
over 10 years seeking an order 
establishing a common law marriage pursuant to UCA §30-1-4.5 (R. 3); the parties 
cohabitated from May 1995 until their separation in early j>006 (R. 3); the parties are both 
of legal age and capable of giving consent (R. 3); and the parties have held themselves 
out and acquired a reputation as husband and wife (R. 4). 
to establish a common law marriage and for the entry of appropriate orders concerning 
custody, child support and property divisions. (R. 4-5). On January 10, 2007, Brown 
filed her Answer to the Verified Petition for Paternity and 
Based thereon Richards sought 
Related Matters. (R. 28-38). 
In her Answer, Brown responded to the allegations 
admitting the parties were never married (R. 28); affirmatively denying that the parties 
in the relevant part, by: 
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separated in early 2006, alleging the parties separated in August, 2005 and therefore do 
not meet the cohabitation element for the establishment of a common law marriage (R. 
29); and a denial of all relief requested by Richards relating to any property and 
affirmatively alleging there was no property to be divided (R. 30). 
On August 8, 2007, Brown filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relating 
to whether Richards timely filed his petition for the establishment of a common law 
marriage. (R. 72-81). On August 8, 2007, Brown filed her Affidavit of Diana Brown in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, wherein she alleged: she purchased 
the home on 459 12th Avenue in December, 1989. (R. 82); she and Richards began 
residing together in May, 1995. (R. 82); they cohabitated until the summer of 2001 when 
they moved into separate bedrooms and completely terminated all sexual relations with 
one another. (R. 83); Richards moved out of the residence at the end of August, 2005 and 
took up residence at 635 K Street where he continued to reside. (R. 83); and the Verified 
Petition filed in December, 2006 was more than one year after they separated in August, 
2005. (R. 83). 
On September 5, 2007, Richards filed his Response to Respondent's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 87-93). Richards did not file an affidavit in support of 
his Response to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On September 5, 
2007, the Honorable Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett recommended that the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment be granted. (R. 94). On September 10, 2007, Richards filed 
his Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation. (R. 95-99). On October 15, 2007, 
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the Court entered its Order on Motion for Partial Summary [Judgment. (R. 110-113). On 
January 9, 2008, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision on Richards Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation, thereby denying the objection. (R. 121-123). In the 
Memorandum Decision, the Court relied on Haddow v. Haddow, 101 P.2d 669 (Utah 
1985) for a definition of "cohabitation" which included common residency and sexual 
contact evidencing a conjugal association. The Court found that it was undisputed that 
the parties terminated all sexual contact in 2001 and Richards moved out of the residence 
in September, 2005. The Court found Richards had one year from the date of the 
termination of the relationship to file his Petition and his petition was not timely filed. 
(R. 121-123). On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided that with respect to the element 
of cohabitation, it was not necessary that the parties' cohabitated within one year of the 
filing of the Petition to establish a common law marriage, 
tense of the phrase a Petitioner need only allege the fact 
trial court's grant of summary judgment. (Court of Appeals 
but rather based on the past 
oi[ cohabitation, reversing the 
Decision, P.9-11). 
The action came before the Court on a bench trial on June 16, 2008, with all trial 
thb exhibits presented to the Court based on stipulation and 
testifying. (R. 225-226). Both Richards and Brown testified 
disputed issues, but most significantly was Richards claini to an entitlement to equity in 
the house Brown owned prior to the commencement of her relationship with Richards. 
(Tr. P. 15, L. 4-10). Richards testified that over the course of the parties' relationship, he 
paid a pro-rata share of the mortgage payments and other Expenses. (Tr. P. 26, L. 1-4; P. 
parties as the only witnesses 
. There were a number of 
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26, L. 5-10; Tr. P. 28, L. 1-5 and P. 67, L. 9-12). In addition, Richards testified that he 
contributed money to improvements to the property, including the construction of a deck. 
(Tr. P. 46, L. 3-25). 
After taking the matter under advisement, on July 9, 2008, the Court issued its 
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 228-251). The Court entered 
detailed Findings of Fact including but not limited to: (a) The parties never married but 
began living together in 1995 and a daughter was born on March 29, 1996. (R. 228, 
Finding #1); (b) The parties separated in August 2005 when Richards moved out of the 
house and rented an apartment six blocks away, paying a monthly rent of $750 per 
month. (R. 229, Finding #3); and (c) While Richards presented evidence which was not 
disputed that he paid $71,100 in monthly payments toward the mortgage, $960.03 in 
home maintenance, $1,024.50 in lawn service, and $12,470 in other house expenses, the 
majority of which related to nearly $9,000.00 to construct a deck, in most cases the Court 
could not discern whether those expenses were incurred for household improvements, or 
simply involved other expenses not related to an improvement to the house. (R. 239, 
Finding #27). 
Based on the complete findings, the Court entered the following Conclusions of 
Law: (a) the home was clearly "premarital property" belonging to Brown. (R. 241, 
Conclusion #30); (b) The parties never married, so there is no "marital estate" to divide. 
When the parties resolved the custody related issues and the Court granted partial 
summary judgment on the common law marriage claim, the case lost its character as a 
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"domestic" case. However, because Richards asserted civil claims, the case proceeded to 
trial. In closing argument, Richards abandoned all claims ixcept unjust enrichment and 
promissory estoppel. (R. 241-242, Conclusion No. 31); (c) Richards is not entitled to any 
share of equity in the home, although the Court found he did set forth a claim for unjust 
enrichment. (R. 242, Conclusion No. 32); (d) After setting forth the elements of a claim 
for unjust enrichment, the Court concluded that the evidence supported a claim of unjust 
enrichment for the amount paid for the new deck ($8,895.00) and it would be unjust to 
permit Brown to retain that benefit without paying the cosi thereof. (R. 242-243, 
Conclusion #33); (e) In addition, the Court made the same finding with respect to the 
costs incurred for the purchase and installation of the swamp cooler ($750.00), sprinkler 
system expenditures ($312.00), and the purchase of a ceiling fan ($179.00) finding the 
total amount by which Brown was unjustly enriched to be $10,136.00. (R. 243, 
Conclusion #34); and (f) With respect to any other amounts, the Court found Richards 
failed to meet his burden of proof. (R. 243, Conclusion #2f 5). 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of ^aw, the Court entered the 
following Order: (a) Petitioner's counsel was to prepare ai[id submit for the Court's 
signature a final order and Determination of Paternity pursuant 
(R. 250, Order #47); and (b) With respect to all other issues 
the Court's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order shall be the final Order of the 
Court and no other form of order will need to be submitted by counsel. (R. 250, Order 
#48). Brown paid Richards the sum of $10,136.00 as ordered by the Court. Despite 
to the parties' stipulation, 
addressed in this decision, 
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having accepted payment in full, Richards never filed a satisfaction of judgment in the 
trial court. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied Brown's argument the appeal was 
rendered moot by accepting payment because no satisfaction of judgment was filed with 
the trial court. See Court of Appeals Decision, P. 4-5, Footnote 9. In addition, it found 
that because UCA §30-1-4.5 was written such that the elements were not of the same 
tense; each element should be treated differently. Thus, the trial court could not conclude 
as a matter of law the parties relationship terminated when they ceased cohabiting. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law when it concluded that a party does 
not waive their right to appeal when they accept the benefits of a judgment but fail to file 
a satisfaction of judgment. While a satisfaction of judgment provides notice to the world 
the judgment has been paid, it provides no notice to the parties to the action who are 
respectively judgment creditor and judgment debtor. Permitting a judgment creditor to 
benefit from their own dilatory failure to file a satisfaction of judgment is bad public 
policy which encourages both noncompliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
sharp practice to gain a financial advantage through tactical chicanery. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals eifed in interpreting Utah Code Annotated §30-
1-4.5. The Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion the elements are written in different 
tenses thereby requiring a different treatment to the various elements of the statute. The 
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Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that an action may I be filed more than one year 
after the parties ceased cohabiting and nonetheless be timely under the statute of repose. 
The Court of Appeals erred in remanding the action to the Trial court when there are no 
disputed issues of material fact. In such case, whether the parties ceasing to cohabit 
effectuated a termination of their relationship for purposes of the statute of repose must 
be decided as a matter of law. Lastly, this Court should take this opportunity to provide 
guidance to both the bench and the bar regarding the elements necessary to establish an 
unsolemnized marriage, the proofs required, as well as their application to the statute of 
repose. 
ARGUMENT 
It is bad public policy to permit a judgment creditor to accept the benefits of a judgment 
yet maintain an appeal simply by failing to file a satisfaction of judgment. 
On appeal, Brown argued the appeal was moot based on her voluntary payment of 
the judgment and the acceptance thereof by Richards. In {footnote 9 of its decision, the 
Court of Appeals stated: 
Brown argues that because she has voluntarily paid the judgment and Richards has 
accepted it, the controversy is moot and Richards Was waived his right to appeal. 
See generally Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 
(1973)(discussing general rule of mootness and waiver of appeal once judgment 
has been voluntarily satisfied). We reject Brown's argument because although 
Richards does not dispute he received payment, there is no satisfaction of 
judgment in the record. See Hollingsworth v. Farmers Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 637, 639 
(Utah 1982)(requiring the execution of a satisfaction of judgment to moot a 
controversy). 
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See Decision attached hereto in the Appendix. Brown believes it is simply bad public 
policy to permit a judgment creditor to accept the benefits of a judgment yet maintain an 
appeal by failing to file a satisfaction of judgment. Such a policy encourages playing fast 
and loose with the rules in order to secure every conceivable tactical advantage and 
effectuates a shifting of the burden of risks which is proscribed by Utah law. 
As appropriately noted by the Court of Appeals, the general rule of mootness after 
accepting voluntary payment of a judgment is set forth in Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 
154, 514P.2d 1142, 1143 (1973). In Jensen, the Court stated the general rule is that "if a 
judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and a judgment satisfied, the controversy 
has become moot and the right to appeal is waived." Id. At 157. The judgment is 
satisfied when paid, not when the satisfaction of judgment is filed with the Court. 
Interpreting the plain words using their plain meaning, Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"satisfaction" as meaning: 
Act of satisfying; the state of being satisfied. Seago v. New YorkR. Co., 349 Mo. 
1249, 164 S.W.2d 336, 341. The discharge of an obligation by paying a party 
what is due him (as on a mortgage, lien, note, or contract), or what is awarded to 
him, by the judgment of a court or otherwise. Thus, a judgment is satisfied by the 
payment of the amount due to the party who has recovered such judgment, or by 
levying the amount. . . . 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1991)[emphasis supplied]. Thus, when Brown paid the 
judgment, it was satisfied. 
While the Court of Appeals recognized a requirement of the execution of a 
satisfaction of judgment to moot a controversy based on Hollingsworth v. Farmers Ins. 
Co., 655 P.2d 637, 639 (Utah 1982), this ministerial requirement does not alter the fact 
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the judgment was satisfied as between the parties but rathe r^ provides notice to third 
parties that such satisfaction has occurred. To hold otherwise exalts form over substance 
as between the parties and ignores the import of imparting Notice to the parties to the 
action. 
The filing of the satisfaction of the judgment doe^ not alter the reality of full 
payment of the judgment by the judgment debtor and its acceptance by the judgment 
creditor. The filing of the satisfaction of the judgment doe|s however alter the state of 
notice as to third parties. The satisfaction of judgment equates to an official receipt. See 
Istric v. Norcon Elecs., Inc., 00146892, 2005 NY Slip Op £0677 (5/9/05). When filed 
with the clerk of the court, it imparts notice to the world tibfat there is no longer an 
outstanding judgment. Id. 
There are other provisions in Utah which impart Notice to the world without 
impacting the rights as between the parties. For instance, the recordation of document of 
conveyance constitutes notice to the world of the existence of the conveyance. See e.g. 
Huffakerv. First Nat'l Bank of Brigham City, 52 Utah 31^, 173 P. 903, 904 (1918). 
Recording does not however alter the interests of the parties to the conveyance. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-3-102(3) (Supp. 1998); Crowther v. Mow^r, 876 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
Ct.App.), cert, denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994); See al$o Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 
P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983). Thus, where the purpose of alnotice provision is designed to 
provide notice to the world, but does not impact the rights| of the parties to the 
proceeding, the provision of notice does not alter the substantive rights of the parties to 
whom no notice is imparted. 
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The acceptance of the benefit doctrine waives the right to appeal as a matter of 
long standing Utah law. In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987) the Court 
quoted Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117, 1118 
(1920), for the proposition that where "a party to an action accepts the benefits of a 
judgment in his favor or acquiesces in a judgment against him he thereby waives his right 
to have said judgment reviewed on appeal[.]ff 
The concept of waiver of appeal is also described as the "acceptance-of-benefit" 
doctrine. As noted by the Court in Trees, supra, this doctrine invokes a significant shift 
in the burden of risk. The Trees court stated, "An appellant who accepts the benefits of a 
judgment from which he is appealing accomplishes a significant shift in the burden of 
risk; he exposes the respondent to the possibility not only to a possible loss on appeal, but 
also the potential loss of the benefit he has provided to the appellant." Trees at 614. The 
Trees court foreshadowed precisely what occurred in the instant case. Brown voluntarily 
paid the judgment. Thereafter, not only did she lose a significant portion of the appeal 
resulting in remand and further litigation, but also the loss of benefit she provided to 
Richards. The very purpose of the "acceptance-of-benefit" doctrine has been gutted by 
the imposition of a procedural condition precedent which in no way alters the factual 
reality of the post judgment actions of the parties nor the actual satisfaction of the 
judgment. Rather, it tips the scales of equity in favor of a judgment creditor who may 
accept the benefits of the judgment and continue to appeal based on his own failure to 
diligently comply with his duties and responsibilities to the judgment debtor and under 
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the rules of civil procedure. In the instant case, the judgment was satisfied, the benefit 
accepted, and Richards waived his right to appeal the judghient. 
To permit a judgment creditor to accept the benefits of the judgment not only 
effectuates a shift of risks, but also encourages sharp practice and tactical chicanery. 
"[The rules of civil procedure] must all be looked to in the |light of their even more 
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the 
parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they 
have pertaining to their dispute." Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Ut^h 2d 205, 211,381 P.2d 86, 
91 (1963). However, in so liberalizing both pleading and procedure, the focus remains 
on insuring procedures and process which "effect total faii)ness for all parties in a suit." 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 313 (Utah App. 1992). Ms set forth in Rule 1, Utah R. 
Civ. Pro., 
They shall be liberally construed to secure tfye just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
Id. Clearly, with a focus on both orderly proceedings whibh protect due process by 
insuring fairness in the proceedings. 
It is unquestionable, that a policy which encourages the violation of the spirit if 
not the letter of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and endourages conduct which 
discourages the just determinations of the action is simpl^ bad public policy. To hold 
otherwise will sanction judgment creditors to shirk their responsibility under Rule 5 8 A, 
Utah R. Civ. Pro., to gain both the benefit of payment of ^he judgment while contesting 
the benefits retained. 
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This Court should clarify the import of a satisfaction of judgment. While its 
filing provides notice to third parties, it does not alter the factual reality between the 
parties. The satisfaction of judgment does not provide any notice to the parties which 
was not already imparted by both the payment and acceptance of the judgment sum. If a 
judgment creditor accepts the benefits of the judgment, this Court should rule as a matter 
of law they have waived their right to appeal that judgment.1 This Court should rule that 
Richards waived his right to appeal regardless of his failure to file the satisfaction of 
judgment. 
II 
For purposes of establishing a common law marriage and clarity of the applicable 
standards, the action should be filed within one year of the termination of cohabitation 
In a grammarian exercise, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment, not based on questions of fact, but because it determined Brown was 
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the Court of Appeals 
complicated an already complex, fact specific standard, by interpreting Utah Code 
Annotated §30-1-4.5 to require only that the parties cohabited at some distant time in the 
past, but not within one year of the filing of the Petition to establish a valid unsolemnized 
marriage. This Court should take this opportunity, for the benefit of both the bench and 
1
 The Appellant is not suggesting that the exceptions to the right to appeal collateral 
matters which are not altered by the payment of the judgment should be abrogated. 
However, the mere technicality of the failure to file a satisfaction of judgment by the 
party responsible to do so should not vitiate their waiver of the right to appeal the benefit 
accepted. 
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the bar, to clarify the precise requirements to establish a cotnmon law marriage within the 
required statute of repose, including therein the effect of termination of cohabitation. 
The Court of Appeals determined the statute of repose under the act is triggered 
by the termination of the relationship. (Decision, f23). Tl^ e parties admitted they had 
cohabited. (Decision, ^25). The Court of Appeals decided! under the terms of the statute 
this is all that is required, effectively holding the terminati0n of cohabitation did not as a 
matter of law result in the termination of the relationship a? required to trigger the statute 
of repose. Id. Rather, the Court concluded that Richards \^as entitled to present evidence 
that despite his no longer residing with Brown, the relatioriship continued after the 
termination of cohabitation. Id. 
The Court of Appeals analyzed the relevant statute UCA §30-1-4.5. Citing to 
Utah Dep yt of Transp. V. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ^ [22, the Couift correctly stated, "Our 
primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the| legislative intent as evidenced 
by the plain language in light of the purpose the statute w^s meant to achieve." Court of 
Appeals Decision, f23. It then properly attempted to readlthe elements contained in UCA 
§30-1-4.5 in light of the statute of repose, concluding the Express language of the statute 
anticipates a different treatment for some of those elementts. Id. 
In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeals then parsed out the statute, 
concluding the elements involved the use of different verb tenses. Id. at ^[25. The Court 
of Appeals found that while elements (a) ["are of legal ag^ and capable of giving 
consent"] and (b) ["are legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage under this 
chapter"] were present tense, element (c) ["have cohabited"] is written in the past tense. 
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Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that as a matter of law the date Richards moved 
out does not "determine when the relationship terminated by the failure of one of the 
elements required by section 30-1-4.5(1)." Id. Instead, the Court concluded Richards 
was entitled to present evidence that despite his having moved out of the home (thereby 
terminating the parties' cohabitation) such act did not terminate the relationship. Id. 
Brown believes the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the statute both 
in terms of the manner in which it diagrammed the sentence as well as its matter of law 
conclusion regarding the effect of the undisputed fact of Ricards moving out of Brown's 
home. Element (C) is not necessarily written in the past tense. Rather, the phrase "have 
cohabited" is most likely written in the present perfect tense. The word "have" is an 
auxiliary verb coupled with the past participle "cohabited." Two examples highlight the 
difference between the past tense and the present perfect tense. The sentence 
"The parties cohabited for five years." 
is written in the past tense, without the benefit of an auxiliary verb. The act of 
cohabitation is presumed complete and concluded. In contrast, the following sentence, 
written in the present perfect tense contemplates a continuation of the act of cohabitation 
in the present tense: 
"The parties have cohabited for five years." 
In this second example, the act of cohabitation may not yet have concluded. The use of 
the auxiliary verb "have" coupled with the past participle "cohabited" denotes the present 
perfect tense. 
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Generally, effective writing contemplates a parallelism in tense. Arguably, the 
legislature would, whenever possible, make all of the dependent clauses {i.e. the elements 
necessary to establish an unsolemnized marriage) agree in tense. Thus, the proper 
grammatical conclusion is the element "have cohabited" is | written in the present perfect 
tense, not the past tense. 
The rules of statutory construction are well established under Utah law. First, 
the various parts of a section are to be read together. Lund\ v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 
f 23, 11 P.3d 277. A statute should not be read in piecemeal but rather as a 
comprehensive whole. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 80S P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). 
This Court should interpret a statutes provisions in harmony with other statutes in the 
same chapter and related chapters. See State v. Schofield, J2002 UT 132, f 8, 63 P.3d 667, 
cert, denied, 540 U.S. 820, 124 S.Ct. 104, 157 L.Ed.2d 391(2003). Finally, statutory 
interpretation should "avoid interpretations that will rendet portions of a statute 
superfluous or inoperative." Hall v. Utah State Dep't ofCc^rr., 2001 UT 34, f 15, 
24P.3d958. 
Having determined the elements in UCA §30-l-4).5(l) are all written in the 
present tense, the elements in subsection (1) must be read n^ conjunction with the 
requirements of subsection (2). UCA §30-1-4.5(2) states, 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur 
during the relationship described in Subsection (1)J or within one year following 
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under 
this section may be manifested in any form, and m^y be proved under the same 
general rules of evidence as facts in pther cases. 
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Id. In order to give complete effect to the statute of repose contained in subsection (2), 
the required elements contained in subsection (1) must be read together with the statute of 
repose. 
The Court of Appeals correctly found that to establish a valid unsolemnized 
marriage, no one element is given greater weight than another, but rather all elements 
must be proven. Court of Appeals Decision, f 20. Thus, one can better understand the 
inter-relationship between the elements set forth in subsection (1) and the statute of 
repose set forth in subsection (2) through a simple exercise of "redrafting" the elements 
and statute of repose as one. By way of example, redrafted conjunctively for each 
element, the first sentence of subsection (2) reads: 
• The determination or establishment that the parties are of legal age and capable 
of giving consent must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), 
or within one year following the termination of that relationship. [Subsection 
(l)(a) and 2 combined]; 
• The determination or establishment that the parties are legally capable of 
entering into a solemnized marriage under this chapter must occur during the 
relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following the 
termination of that relationship. [Subsection (l)(b) and 2 combined]; 
• The determination or establishment that the parties have cohabited must occur 
during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following 
the termination of that relationship. [Subsection (l)(c) and 2 combined]; 
• The determination or establishment that the parties have mutually assume 
marital rights, duties and obligations must occur during the relationship described 
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship. 
[Subsection 1(d) and 2 combined]; and 
• The determination or establishment that the parties hold themselves out as and 
have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife must occur 
during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following 
the termination of that relationship. [Subsection 1(e) and 2 combined]. 
In a case filed to establish an unsolemnized marriage which includes a claim for a divorce 
upon such a finding, each of these elements must have existed within one year of their 
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termination or the statute of repose is rendered a nullity. Ctearly, any interpretation to the 
contrary ignores both the plain language of the statute as w^ll as the legislative intent 
which is expressed only in the chosen language. 
The Court of Appeals creates a standard which is }iow more complicated and 
difficult to apply than ever before. By way of example onl^, in the instant case, the 
parties had a child together. Because of their mutual desir^ to remain involved in the 
child's life, the parties continue to have a relationship witW one another, albeit a "divorce-
like" rather than "marriage-like" relationship. Clearly, while their relationship evolved, it 
did not entirely terminate, nor will it ever. Thus, under th^ Court of Appeals standard, 
Richards would have the right to put on evidence of the relationship's continuation and 
argue its evolved continuation. However, in a clear statement, in Walters v. Walters, 812 
P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991), footnote 2, the Court stated, "Section 30-1-4.5 recognizes a 
marriage relationship between cohabitants if the relationship satisfies certain specified 
requirements." Id. [emphasis supplied]. Thus, when the pjarties permanently cease 
cohabiting, the relationship as a matter of law is terminate^, commencing the statute of 
repose to run. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals standard contravenes the very purposes 
previously found regarding the statute of repose as applied to common law marriage. In 
In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ^ f 25, 1 P.3d 10^4, this Court recognized 
that the one-year statute of limitations in section 30-1-4.5 s^ meant to "protect parties who 
never meant to be statutorily married from adjudications [bf marriage] many years after 
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their relationship has ended." Yet despite this declaration from this Court, the Court of 
Appeals standard specifically invites such belated adjudications. 
There are undoubtedly more concrete standards which provide a measure of 
certainty to both the bench and the bar. In Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538, the 
Court held the date of permanent separation constituted the date of termination of the 
relationship. In other jurisdictions, the cohabitation requirement is one of "continuing 
cohabitation." See e.g. Warner v. Layland, 770 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa App. 2009) and 
Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 552 Pa. 253, 261-62, 714 A.2d 1016, 1020 (1998). 
Undoubtedly, there are circumstances where the parties have not terminated their 
relationship albeit they are not residing under the same roof at all times. See Winfield v. 
Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640, 646-48 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1991, writ denied) 
(concluding evidence of cohabitation sufficient when man only spent about 100 days with 
woman in two years); see also Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex.App.-San 
Antonio 1998, writ denied) (concluding that evidence sufficient to establish cohabitation 
element between man, a Mexican national whose permanent residence was in Nuevo 
Laredo, and woman, even though man split time between homes); Bolash v. Heid, 733 
S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ) (holding that evidence that man, 
employed in Nigeria, stayed at woman's residence during his periodic visits to Texas was 
sufficient to support finding that they lived together as husband and wife "to the extent 
possible under the circumstances"). However, the instant case does not present similar 
facts. The undisputed facts are that Richards moved out of the house in August, 2005 and 
never again resided therein, instead he rented his own place six blocks away. (R. 229, 
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Finding #3). In August, 2005 there was a permanent separation which effectuated the 
termination of the parties' relationship. 
The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the statfute. Because of the broader 
application to both the bench and bar in an area of law whi^h has scant precedent and for 
which the standards are confusing at best, this Court should take this opportunity to 
provide guidance and clarity. However, in so doing, it should not remand this matter 
back to the trial court to take evidence as ordered by the Ci>urt of Appeals. The facts are 
undisputed. Richards permanently moved out of Brown's Residence in September, 2005. 
Court of Appeals Decision, ^|17. Under the undisputed fadts of this case, the parties 
"cohabitation" terminated on that undisputed date. However, he did not file his action to 
determine or establish the existence of the alleged unsolenjmized marriage until 
December 21, 2006. (R. 1-8). Thus, as a matter of law hi^ ; action fails because the 
element of cohabitation terminated more than one year prit>r to filing his action. 
This Court should adopt a rule which provides th^ statute of repose commences 
to run from the permanent termination of the parties' cohabitation. There is precedent to 
support this interpretation of the statute. In Clark v. Clarl^ 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538 this 
2
 This terminated the parties "marriage like" and conjugal Relationship, however it did not 
terminated their "divorce-like" custodial relationship as they share a child in common and 
admirably both are actively involved in that child's life. Thus, it should be expected they 
will continue to have a divorce-like custodial relationship 
child and for the sake of both parties, hopefully as long as 
child and her progeny. This evolved relationship is irrele\p 
when their relationship for purposes of establishing an un^olemnized marriage 
terminated. 
throughout the minority of the 
they live as it relates to their 
ant to the determination of 
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Court affirmed the finding of the trial court that the date of the termination of a common 
law marriage was the date "when a final separation occurred." Id. at 540, 543. In Clark, 
the Court found ample evidence supporting the date of separation as the date of 
termination of the relationship, clearly a finding based on disputed facts. Obviously, if 
the facts are in dispute, they must be resolved through a full evidentiary review. 
However, where the facts are not in dispute, the Court can rule as a matter of law whether 
an undisputed permanent separation and termination of cohabitation resulted in the 
termination of the relationship for purposes of the running of the statute of repose. In the 
instant case, there simply is no doubt the termination of cohabitation constituted the 
termination of the parties' relationship for purposes of triggering the statute of repose. 
In the instant case, this Court has an opportunity to provide clarity to a vague 
and confusing statute. This is the opportunity for this Court to provide both the bench 
and bar with a workable standard which clearly defines when a relationship terminates 
for purposes of the statute of repose running as well as the evidentiary requirements for 
establishing that termination. The rule established by the Court of Appeals is 
unworkable, overly complicated and invites the very circumstances which the precedence 
of this State define as the very purpose of the statute of repose. After having provided 
such clarity and guidance, however under the facts of this case this Court should rule as a 
matter of law the undisputed facts when applied to the law mandate the conclusion the 
relationship terminated in September, 2005 when Richards permanently moved out of 
Brown's residence. Because he did not file the instant action until December, 2006, the 
statute of repose had run. 
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Conclusion 
Brown respectfully requests this Court to reverse th^ Court of Appeals. First, 
Richards appeal was waived by his acceptance of the benefit of the judgment. While the 
filing of a satisfaction of judgment may well impact the rights of the parties as to third 
parties to the action, it provides no notice which the partie$ to the action did not already 
have. The technical requirement of filing a notice of satisfaction should never alter the 
judgment creditor's waiver of their right to appeal when th^ burden is upon the judgment 
creditor to file that satisfaction of judgment. To hold otherwise is simply bad public 
policy. 
This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals interpretation of UCA §30-1-4.5. 
First, the Court of Appeals improperly diagrammed this section and incorrectly 
concluded that subsection (c) is written in the past tense. $econd, this Court needs to 
clarify all of the standards related to common law marriagp, most significantly the 
interplay of cohabitation and termination of the relationship. Finally, after having 
provided both the bench and bar with guidance and clarity regarding both the 
interpretation of the statutes and their interplay with the presentation of evidence, this 
Court should rule as a matter of law that for purposes of establishing an unsolemnized 
marriage, if the action is not filed within one year of the parties ceasing to cohabit, the 
action fails as a matter of law. This Court should not remind this action to the trial court, 
but should rule that Richards5 action fails as a matter of l^w because it was not timely 
filed. 
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STATEMENT OF SPECIFIC RELIEF REQUESTED 
Brown requests the following relief: 
1. Reverse the Court of Appeals decision that waiver does not occur by accepting 
the benefits of a judgment but failing to file a satisfaction of judgment and rule 
as a matter of law the filing of a satisfaction of judgment is irrelevant to the 
issue of waiver of the right to appeal as between the original judgment creditor 
and judgment debtor if they were parties to the action in which the judgment 
was rendered. 
2. Reverse the Court of Appeals decision interpreting when the statute of repose 
runs for purposes of establishing1 an unsolemnized marriage when the parties 
have ceased cohabiting more thaii one year prior to the action being filed. 
3. Provide guidance to the bench and bar regarding Utah's unsolemnized 
marriage state in terms of both its elements, proof, and timeliness of filing the 
action. 
Dated and Signed this<^M_ day of February, 2010. 
y* / 
Tiaelce Van Dijk 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CU-
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McHUGH, Judge: 
%1 Steve Richards appeals the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Diana Brown on Richards's claim that the 
parties had an unsolemnized marriage pursuant to Utah Code 
section 30-1-4.5. Richards next challenges the trial court's 
order, which denied him an interest in the equity in Brown's home 
and reimbursement for home maintenance expenses Richards incurred 
while living with Brown. Finally, Richards contends that the 
trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to conduct 
adequate discovery by allowing Brown's motion for a protective 
order. We reverse the order of partial summary judgment on the 
unsolemnized marriage claim. We affirm the trial court's 
decision in favor of Brown on the equitable claims and its entry 
of a protective order. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 Richards and Brown lived together in 
1995 to September 2005.2 Although Richards 
times, Brown never accepted, and thus, the 
They have one child (Daughter) , who was boriji 
Brown's home1 from May 
proposed several 
parties never married, 
in 1996. 
%3 Throughout the relationship, the parties maintained separate 
banking accounts but shared living expenses and costs associated 
with Daughter. Over the ten-year period, Richards contributed 
$71,100 to Brown's mortgage, initially paying $400 per month, 
voluntarily increasing his monthly payment 
birth of Daughter, and again voluntarily increasing his payment 
to $650 in 2003. Brown's monthly mortgage payments varied, 
starting at $1187 when Richards moved in an 
in 2003.3 Brown promised to treat Richards 
him an interest in the home equity. Richarjds also testified that 
Brown promised to put his name on the title 
conceded that she made these promises but maintained that they 
were always conditional upon Richards first 
of the existing equity and contributing to 
expenses. Brown never indicated that she t 
a tenant, and she did not report his monthly payments as rental 
income on her tax returns.4 The trial court found Richards's 
testimony to be more credible than Brown's 
p. increasing to $1516 
fairly and to give 
to the home. Brown 
paying her one-half 
[the mortgage and other 
nought of Richards as 
14 The parties' remaining household and 
divided evenly. For most expenses, Brown t| child expenses were allied the 
1Brown purchased the home in 1989 with her ex-husband. As 
part of the divorce settlement in 1991, Brcjwn paid her ex-husband 
$11,800 in exchange for his relinquishment 'of his interest in the 
home. 
2The trial court found that Richards mbved out of Brown's 
home in either August or September 2005. For purposes of our 
review of the grant of partial summary judgment, we use the date 
most favorable to Richards--September 2005. 
3The mortgage payments adjusted both ubward and downward 
during the ten years of cohabitation. At least two increases 
were attributable to Brown's equity withdrawals while refinancing 
the home. Richards did not receive any portion of those 
withdrawals, and on neither occasion did Brown add his name to 
the title. 
4The parties filed separate tax returnls but strategically 
allocated exemptions and deductions to maximize their refunds, 
which they split equally. 
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expenditures bimonthly and presented Richards with a bill for 
one-half the costs, which he always "paid without question." 
Occasionally, expenditures were not included in the bimonthly 
tally, but the parties shared these expenses by alternating who 
would pay for them. For example, Richards contributed over 
$10,000 toward significant home improvements, including replacing 
the deck, installing a swamp cooler and ceiling fan, and setting 
up a sprinkler system. Richards also owned the only car, which 
he used for his personal transportation, Daughter's 
transportation, and family outings and errands. Brown did not 
have a driver license and did not drive during the relationship. 
%5 After Richards moved out of Brown's home in September 2 0 05, 
the parties continued to socialize together through December 
2 0 05, including celebrating Brown's and Richards's birthdays, 
Thanksgiving, and Christmas as a family. In October 2005, the 
parties engaged in mediation to resolve custody issues. The 
parties also attended an education class for divorcing parents 
and mailed a letter announcing their "divorce" to family and 
friends.5 Although they initially intended to mediate the 
property distribution, Brown later canceled that mediation. 
Richards testified that he delayed filing a petition for 
adjudication of unsolemnized marriage because he believed the 
parties would either resolve the property dispute through 
mediation or reconcile.6 By early 2006, Richards realized that 
reconciliation was no longer a possibility. 
%6 In December 2006, Richards filed a Verified Petition for 
Paternity and Related Matters, in which he asked the court to 
either recognize the parties as married pursuant to the 
unsolemnized marriage statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 
(2007),7 or award him an equitable interest in Brown's home. 
Brown filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the 
unsolemnized marriage claim, arguing that Richards filed his 
petition outside the one-year statute of repose. Following a 
hearing, the domestic commissioner recommended that Brown's 
motion for partial summary judgment be granted. The trial court 
accepted the commissioner's recommendation because a 
5It is unclear from the record when the parties mailed the 
letter. 
it 
6Richards was also unaware that he had to file a petition to 
have their relationship recognized as a legal marriage within one 
year of the termination of the relationship. 
7We cite to the current codification of Utah Code section 
30-1-4.5 because the current version is identical to the version 
in effect when Richards filed the petition. 
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"relationship [for purposes of unsolemnized 
terminated by cessation of the [required e 
cohabitation." The trial court concluded 
factual dispute that cohabitation had ended 
and Richards's petition was filed over a 
marriage] i s 
lament of] 
tljiat the re was no 
by September 2005, 
later. ye^r 
%1 The equitable claims were reserved for a bench trial. At 
trial, Richards testified that Brown promised as early as 
September 1996 to put his name on the title of the home. 
Richards also indicated that at various poihts during the 
relationship he "felt insecure about [his] financial position 
. . . in the family" and that Brown "recognized that [insecurity] 
. . . and she assured [him] on several occasions that [he could] 
just take her word for it"--that she would treat him like she did 
her ex-husband. Yet when Brown twice refinanced the house during 
the relationship, she did not add Richards co the title. 
Nevertheless, Richards failed to take any steps to ensure that he 
was given legal interest in the home.8 
f8 Richards also presented evidence that he contributed over 
$12,000 to home improvements and an additional $2000 to home 
trial court concluded 
the cost of the 
maintenance over the ten-year period. The 
that Brown had received a benefit equal to 
purchase and installation of the deck, swamb cooler, sprinkler 
system, and ceiling fan. Accordingly, it oprdered Brown to 
reimburse Richards $10,136 under an unjust 
The trial court rejected, however, Richards! 
because it concluded that these expenses we 
categorized as home maintenance expenditure 
declined to reimburse Richards for his home 
(enrichment theory. 
fs additional expenses 
re more appropriately 
s. The trial court 
maintenance 
contributions because these expenses did not enhance the value of 
the home in such a manner that it conferred "a specific benefit 
upon [Brown] which in fairness she should be required to repay." 
Brown asserts that she has paid Richards orj that judgment.9 
8Richards also testified that in 1999 
to his repeated requests to be added to thd 
home paperwork to refinance the house 
wanted to think about whether refinancing 
for them. Two days later, the paperwork wa[ 
sudden disappearance of the paperwork, 
the fact Brown brought home paperwork "gav^ 
[Brown] was interested in [his] financial 
pr 2000, in response 
title, Brown brought 
Ridhards told her he 
4ade financial sense 
s "gone." Despite the 
Richards maintained that 
[him] confidence that 
ition." 5>os: 
9Brown argues that because she has volfuntarily paid the 
judgment and Richards has accepted it, the controversy is moot 
and Richards has waived his right to appeal. See generally 
Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 3442, 1143 (1973) 
(continued. 
20080682-CA 4 
i[9 With respect to Richards's contributions to the mortgage, 
the trial court concluded that Richards failed to establish the 
amount of the benefit conferred upon Brown, leaving the trial 
court unable to calculate the appropriate amount Richards should 
be reimbursed under a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial 
court likewise concluded that Richards failed to demonstrate the 
reasonable reliance necessary to support a claim of promissory 
estoppel. In addition, the trial court denied Richards's claim 
of promissory estoppel on the grounds that he did not meet his 
burden of proving the fact and amount of damages. Richards 
appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
KlO The first question before us is whether the trial court 
erred in determining that the relationship between Richards and 
Brown terminated, and the statute of repose under the 
unsolemnized marriage statute was triggered, as of the time that 
Richards moved out of Brown's home in September 2005. We review 
questions of statutory interpretation for correctness. See Jeffs 
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1241 (Utah 1998). We also review the 
grant of summary judgment for correctness. See Forsberg v. Bovis 
Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146, % 7, 184 P.3d 610, cert, 
denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008). 
fll Richards next claims that even in the absence of an 
unsolemnized marriage, he is entitled to recover his 
contributions to the mortgage under the equitable theories of 
unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. Claims based on 
equitable doctrines "are mixed questions of fact and law." U.S. 
Realty 86 Assocs. v. Security Inv.t Ltd., 2002 UT 14, 1 11, 40 
P.3d 586. Accordingly, we defer to a trial court's factual 
findings unless there is clear error but review its legal 
conclusions for correctness. See Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244. 
However, because of the fact-intensive nature of equitable 
doctrines, we grant the trial court broader discretion in 
applying the law to the facts. See id. at 1245 (giving trial 
court broad deference when reviewing claim of unjust enrichment); 
9(...continued) 
(discussing general rule of mootness and waiver of appeal once 
judgment has been voluntarily satisfied). We reject Brown's 
argument because although Richards does not dispute that he 
received payment, there is no satisfaction of judgment in the 
record. See Hollingsworth v. Farmers Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 637, 639 
(Utah 1982) (requiring the execution of a satisfaction of 
judgment to moot a controversy). 
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Department of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker vL Irizarrv, 
676, 678 (Utah 1997) (same for estoppel claim). 
945 P.2d 
1[12 We review for an abuse of discretion t 
determination that Richards failed to 
evidence to establish damages, and we will 
court's decision unless there was no reas 
decision. See Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT 
817 ("When a reasonable basis exists for 
[determination of] damages, this court will 
court's decision] on appeal."); Stevenett v 
Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 1 11, 977 P.2d 508 (" 
decision to remit a damages award based upo)i 
evidence . . . for an abuse of discretion." 
tie t r i a l court ' s 
sufficient 
hot overturn the trial 
on^ .ble basis for the 
5, 1 16, 994 P.2d 
trial court's 
affirm the [trial 
Wal-Mart Stores, 
introduce 
App 
thfe 
We review a court's 
insufficiency of 
i[l3 Finally, Richards asserts that the trikl court improperly 
granted Brown's request for a protective order, which limited his 
ability to conduct discovery. "We review a district court's 
ruling on a discovery issue for abuse of discretion." Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 1 59, 150 P.3d 480. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Unsolemnized Marriage 
maJrr 1(14 Utah law recognizes an unsolemnized 
valid marriage if a court determines that 
contract between a man and a woman" who: 
and capable of giving consent"; (2) are " 
entering a solemnized marriage under the p 
chapter 1]"; (3) "have cohabited"; (4) 
duties, and obligations" of marriage; and (| 
as husband and wife and have acquired a 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (2007). Howe^e 
relationship established as a marriage, a j} 
declaration of marriage must be filed with 
during the relationship described by Utah 
4.5(1) or within one year of its terminati 
4.5(2); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UTf 
(interpreting subsection (2) of section 30 
filing of a petition for adjudication of 
after the termination of the relationship" 
iage as a legal and 
it arises out of a 
1) are "of legal age 
gaily capable of 
rjovisions of [title 30, 
ly assume rights, 
5) hold themselves out 
ation as such. See 
r, to have the 
etition for 
the district court 
Cfode section 30-1-
See id. § 30-1-
28, 1 30, 1 P.3d 1074 
1-4.5 to require "the 
marriage within one year 
"mutual 
reput 
On 
Kl5 The trial court ruled that Richards's claim under section 
30-1-4.5 was barred by the running of the ^tatute of repose. In 
reaching that decision, the trial court concluded first that the 
date the parties ceased to cohabit was undisputed and second that 
the relationship described in section 30-l44.5 ended on that 
date. Because the petition to establish aif unsolemnized marriage 
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was not filed within one year of the date the parties agree 
Richards moved out of Brown's home, the trial court granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of Brown. 
A. There Are No Material Facts in Dispute As to When the Parties 
Ceased to Cohabit. 
%1G Relying on the Utah Supreme Courtfs decision in Clark v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538, Richards challenges the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling. In Clark, the supreme court 
reaffirmed the holding of In re Marriage of Gonzales, 2000 UT 28, 
1 P.3d 1074, that an action to establish an unsolemnized marriage 
under section 30-1-4.5 "is timely if filed within one year of the 
termination of the relationship," even if the proceeding to have 
the unsolemnized marriage legally established is not concluded by 
that time. Clark, 2001 UT 44, H 11. Richards contends that, in 
reaching its decision in Clark, the supreme court recognized that 
the definition of cohabitation is not as precise as the one 
employed by the trial court. Instead, Richards contends that the 
Clark decision acknowledges the reality of conflicts in 
relationships that may involve temporary separations. See id. 
U 17 (relying on record evidence that established that the 
parties had a brief period of separation during which the 
partners continued to spend the night together on occasion, 
exchanged expressions of love and affection, and shared expenses, 
as evidence that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's finding of cohabitation). Thus, Richards contends 
that it was inappropriate for the trial court to conclude as a 
matter of law that cohabitation here ended at the time he moved 
out of Brown's home. Instead, Richards asserts that he was 
entitled to put on evidence concerning when cohabitation between 
these parties ended. 
i[l7 While we agree that the date upon which cohabitation ceases 
may require a factual inquiry, thereby making summary judgment 
unavailable, the record reflects that there was no factual 
dispute raised by Richards on that point in the trial court. To 
the contrary, Richards concedes in his statement of facts in his 
response to the motion for partial summary judgment that M[t]he 
parties have one child together . . . and cohabited for 
approximately ten years from May 1995 until [Richards] moved out 
of [Brown's] home in approximately September[] 2005." (Emphases 
added.) Thus, in this case there were no material facts in 
dispute on the question of when cohabitation ended. See 
generally Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, % 53, 
2 01 P.3d 966 ("When, as here, the moving party 'challenges an 
element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to 
the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact.'" (quoting Eagar v. 
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Burrows, 2008 UT 42, % 15, 191 P.3d 9)). Rkther than challenging 
Brown's assertion that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact in dispute, Richards conceded the factp that established 
that cohabitation had ended. 
B. The Relationship Terminates upon the FajLlure of One of the 
Elements of Section 30-1-4.5(1). 
118 Richards further argues that the termination of one element 
required for a solemnized marriage under the unsolemnized 
marriage statute does not determine when the relationship ends. 
In support of that argument, Richards relies on the legislature's 
use of the words "termination of that relationship" in subsection 
(2) of section 30-1-4.5. According to Richards, the use of the 
word "relationship" indicates that the legislature did not intend 
for the termination of any one factor to automatically trigger 
the statute of repose. Rather, he asserts, "a fair reading and 
application of the statute is to allow a party to establish 
termination on a case-by-case basis." Richards argues that his 
position is supported by this court's statement in Hansen v. 
Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), that "[n]o single 
factor is determinative" in establishing an unsolemnized 
marriage, see id. at 935. He contends that this must also mean 
that the absence of one element does not automatically terminate 
the relationship. 
fl9 Richards misinterprets our opinion in fcansen. Following our 
statement that " [n]o single factor is determinative," we said, 
"Evidence of each element is essential [to establish an 
unsolemnized marriage]." Id. In so stating, we recognized that 
evidence of a single factor is not sufficient, alone, to create a 
marriage-type relationship for purposes of the unsolemnized 
marriage statute. See id. ("Although 'evidence of general 
reputation, cohabitation, and assumption of marital rights and 
duties would be evidence of consent,' such evidence 'standing 
alone, would not be sufficient.1 'Section 30-1-4.5 requires 
general reputation, cohabitation, and assumption of marital 
obligations as separate elements in addition to consent.'" 
(emphasis added) (quoting Whvte v. Blair" 885 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 
1994))). Consequently, the Hansen opinion does not support 
Richards's argument that an unsolemnized relationship is not 
terminated by the cessation of a single element identified by the 
legislature. 
1(2 0 Moreover, Richards' s position that thel 
disregard the absence of one of the subsectj 
is belied by the language of the statute, 
unsolemnized relationship recognized as a 
marriage, a party must file a petition with| 
either "during the relationship described 
trial court may 
ion (1) requirements 
To have an 
l|egal and valid 
the district court 
i|n Subsection (1) , or 
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within one year following the termination of that relationship." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (2007) (emphasis added). Subsection 
(2)' s use of the word "that" in the second clause to modify the 
word "relationship" references the phrase "the relationship 
described in Subsection (1)," which is used in the previous 
clause. Because "the relationship described in Subsection (1)" 
is one comprised of five identified factors and joined by the 
conjunctive "and," see id. § 30-1-4.5(1), we conclude that 
termination of an unsolemnized marriage occurs at the time any 
one of the statutory factors ceases to exist.10 See generally 
DeLand v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
("We [must] assume the Legislature carefully and advisedly chose 
the statute's words and phrases."). Indeed, we reached the same 
conclusion in Kunz v. Kunz, 2006 UT App 151, 136 P.3d 1278. See 
id. 1 4 0 (holding that the statute of repose began running when 
the section 30-1-4.5(1) relationship ceased to exist by virtue of 
husband's legal inability to enter into a solemnized marriage due 
to his intervening legal marriage to another). 
121 Our conclusion today establishes a rule from which the 
deadline for seeking recognition of the relationship can be more 
easily ascertained in most cases than the case-by-case approach 
suggested by Richards. And we are not convinced that such an 
approach is unfair to the participants because "the one-year time 
limit of section 30-1-4.5(2) acts as a statute of repose" that 
cannot be tolled. Id. f 21. Contrary to Richards's assertions 
that he had only one year in which to establish the existence of 
an unsolemnized marriage, either party to the relationship may 
have it recognized as a legal marriage at any point during the 
relationship and for one year thereafter. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-1-4.5(2); see also Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, % 25, 27 P.3d 
538 (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) (noting that "the 
party seeking to establish the marriage was afforded an 
opportunity to do so that began when the relationship with [his] 
partner began, and ended one year after the termination of that 
relationship"). Thus, Richards had up to eleven years during 
which he could have had his relationship with Brown recognized as 
a legal marriage, so long as all the statutory elements were 
present. 
C. Section 30-1-4.5 Does Not Require the Parties To Be Presently 
Cohabiting. 
10Two of the factors contain requirements expressed in the 
past tense. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (c), (e) (2007). As 
will be discussed further in part I.e., requirements expressed in 
the past tense do not technically cease and thus do not 
automatically terminate the relationship for purposes of 
triggering the statute of repose. 
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f22 Notwithstanding our conclusion that thfe parties did not 
cohabit after Richards moved to a new residence and that the 
extinguishment of any one factor identified in subsection (1) may 
render the relief provided by section 30-1-4.5 unavailable, we 
agree with Richards that partial summary judgment was improperly 
granted. 
|23 In resolving any question concerning t|ie interpretation of a 
statute, we begin with its plain language. See Utah Pep't of 
Transp. v. Iversf 2009 UT 56, % 22 ("Our primary goal in 
interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent 
as evidenced by the plain language in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve." (emphasis ana internal quotation 
marks omitted)). As discussed, the statute! of repose in the 
unsolemnized marriage act is triggered by the termination of a 
section 30-1-4.5(1) relationship, which under some circumstances 
may coincide with the extinguishment of a single element required 
by subsection (1). However, the express language of the statute 
anticipates that the element of cohabitation be treated 
differently. 
1[24 The unsolemnized marriage statute provides as follows: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemhized 
according to this chapter shall be legal and 
valid if a court or administrative order 
establishes that it arises out of| a contract 
between a man and a woman who: 
(a) are of legal age and capable of 
giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of ehtering into 
a solemnized marriage under this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital (rights, 
duties, and obligations; 
(e) who hold themselves out las and have 
acquired a uniform and general reputation as 
husband and wife. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (2007) (emphas|es added). 
[^25 In listing the elements needed to create a relationship that 
may be established as a legal marriage, the legislature used 
different verb tenses for certain requirements. Compare id. 
§ 30-1-4.5(1)(a)-(b) (requiring that the partners presently be of 
legal age and capable of entering into a solemnized marriage), 
with id. § 30-1-4.5(1) (c) (requiring only that the couple have 
cohabited). We assume the legislature useq these different verb 
tenses advisedly. See Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, % 21, 197 
P.3d 636 ("[W]hen examining the statutory language, we assume the 
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legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its 
ordinary meaning." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Unlike 
in Kunz v. Kunz, 2006 UT App 151, 136 P.3d 1278, where the 
husband could not meet the present tense requirement that he be 
capable of entering into a solemnized marriage, id. H 29, the 
parties here agree that they "have cohabited," see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-1-4.5 (1) (c) . That is all that subsection (1) requires. See 
id. Consequently, the date Richards moved out does not, as a 
matter of law, determine when the relationship terminated by the 
failure of one of the elements required by section 30-1-4.5(1). 
f26 Instead, Richards was entitled to present evidence that, 
despite his move from the home, the section 30-1-4.5(1) 
relationship did not terminate until a later date. After the 
trial court hears the evidence concerning the other elements 
required by the statute, it must make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law establishing when the relationship terminated. 
In doing so, the trial court should consider the legislature's 
direction found in the express language of subsection (l).11 If 
the petition to establish an unsolemnized marriage was filed 
within one year of that date, Richards is entitled to go forward 
with his claim under section 30-1-4.5. Because there are 
material issues of fact in dispute on the question of when the 
relationship terminated, we reverse the trial court's partial 
summary judgment decision and remand for further proceedings. 
II. Unjust Enrichment 
%21 Even if he cannot establish an unsolemnized marriage, 
Richards claims he is entitled to compensation under the theory 
of unjust enrichment.12 The trial court rejected this theory, 
"For example, the statute requires that the couple "hold 
themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife." Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (e) 
(2007). The first part of this element is stated in the present 
tense and joined by the conjunction "and" to the general 
reputation requirement, which is stated in the past tense. 
Therefore, to have a relationship that falls within the 
unsolemnized marriage statute, the parties must presently hold 
themselves out as married and must have acquired a reputation as 
such. 
12We do not address Richards's constructive trust or implied 
contracts arguments because Richards abandoned these claims in 
the trial court. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11, 10 P.3d 
346 ("As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court 
may not be raised on appeal."). 
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concluding that Richards had not established the elements of 
unjust enrichment. We agree. 
A. Richards Must Establish the Value of An^ Benefit Conferred on 
Brown to Recover Under a Theory of Unjust Enrichment. 
[^28 To recover on a claim for unjust enrichment,13 Richards must 
establish three elements: 
(1) a benefit conferred on one person by 
another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by 
the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the 
acceptance or retention by the conferee of 
the benefit under such circumstances as to 
make it inequitable for the conferee to 
retain the benefit without payment of its 
value. 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Richards bears the burden of proving 
each of these elements. See id.; see also Desert Miriah, Inc. v. 
B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, K 13, 12 P.3d 5^0 ("The plaintiff 
must prove all three elements to sustain a claim of unjust 
enrichment."). 
[^29 "The first element of [unjust enrichment] 
to measure the benefit conferred on the defendant 
plaintiff." Emergency Physicians Integrated 
County, 2007 UT 72, f 26, 167 P.3d 1080; sefe also 
Constr., Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc., 
(Utah 197 9) (remanding where trial court fa 
essential issue of whether the defendant "hit 
[benefitted] by the project carried out by pi 
explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Emergency Physicians 
Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 
2d 
"It is not enough that a benefit was conferi 
rather, the enrichment to the defendant mus^ 
the defendant received a true windfall or 
nothing.1" Id. % 26 (quoting 66 Am. Jur. 
Implied Contracts § 13 (2001)). Furthermore, 
conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's detriment or 
the reasonable value of its services, is the 
recovery." Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamei 
requires the court 
by the 
Care v. Salt Lake 
_ Breitling Bros, 
P.2d 869, 872 
to resolve the 
fact been 
As 
597 
led 
[d] in 
aintiff" 
72, 167 P.3d 1080, 
ed on the defendant, 
be unjust in that 
omething for 
Restitution and 
" [t]he benefit 
measure 
:rica Inv 
of 
. Mgmt LLC, 
4-
13Unjust enrichment is also known as cohtract implied in law 
and is one branch of the doctrine of quantum meruit. See 
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 
72, 1 10, 167 P.3d 1080. 
contract implied in fact, 
The second branch of quantum meruit is 
See id. 
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2006 UT App 331, % 36, 153 P.3d 714 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But see Emergency Physicians, 2007 UT 72, % 29 
(holding that where the benefit is in the form of services, "the 
measure of damages, by the great weight of authority, is the 
reasonable value of the services rendered"). 
[^3 0 Thus, to prevail on his unjust enrichment claim, Richards 
was required to establish that a benefit was conferred on Brown 
and that it would be unjust for her to retain that benefit 
without paying for it. The trial court concluded that Richards 
"failed to carry his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that any portion of the $71,100 in payments he made to 
[Brown] unjustly enriched her to his detriment." Richards 
challenges that ruling on appeal, claiming that "unjust 
enrichment analysis supports an award of equity accumulated over 
ten years or reimbursement of the $71,100." (Emphasis omitted.) 
We now discuss each of these theories. 
B. Richards Is Not Entitled to Reimbursement of the $71,100. 
1(31 We first consider Richards's position that the entire 
$71,100 he paid to Brown during the ten years he lived in her 
home constitutes the amount it would be inequitable for her to 
retain. As the trial court recognized, Richards received 
something in return for those payments--a place to live. See 
id. H 26 (stating that a claim of unjust enrichment requires that 
the defendant receive "a true windfall or something for nothing" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). If Richards had not lived 
with Brown, he would have incurred living expenses elsewhere. 
Upon review of the evidence before it, the trial court concluded 
that the amount Richards would have paid in rent over ten years 
was roughly equal to what he paid to Brown. Consequently, the 
trial court concluded that Brown was not unjustly enriched as a 
result of those monthly payments because she provided Richards 
with a place to live. See Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 
1265, 1269-70 (Colo. 2000) (affirming the appellate court's 
remand for the offset of any unjust enrichment to unmarried owner 
of home by the reasonable rental value former partner received 
while residing in the house). 
1J32 Our review of the record reveals two possible sources of 
evidence on this point. First, Brown charged a tenant $3 00 per 
month in rent prior to 1995 to reside in the basement of the home 
she subsequently shared with Richards. Second, Richards paid 
$750 per month in rent in 2 008 for a home in the same 
neighborhood that is roughly two thirds the size of Brown's 
house. There was no direct evidence offered as to the actual 
rental value of Brown's home at any point during the ten years at 
issue. Consequently, the trial court compared the $3 0 0 per month 
paid to rent Brown's basement prior to 1995 and the $750 per 
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month Richards paid in 2008 for a smaller home, with Richards's 
payments to Brown, which increased from $40(p in 1995 to $650 by 
2003. 
1[3 3 The record reflects that Richards bega](i 
in May 1995 and relocated in September 2005 
months. Thus, Richards paid an average of 
month during that time. Where there was no 
in the record, we defer to the trial court' 
amounts [Richards] contributed monthly [we] 
his rental costs would have been if he had 
apartment somewhere close-by to where his 
On the record before us, we cannot say that 
exceeded its broad discretion in finding 
Brown roughly equal to the rental value of 
shared. See generally Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
(Utah 1998) (recognizing the fact-intensive 
doctrines and granting the trial court broad 
residing with Brown 
a period of 125 
Approximately $569 per 
more precise evidence 
finding that "the 
e in line with what 
ented a house or 
daughter was living." 
the trial court 
amounts paid to 
:^he home the parties 
P.2d 1234, 1244-45 
nature of equitable 
discretion). 
theb 
C. The Evidence in the Record Is Insuffici 
Amount of Any Benefit to Brown in the Form 
pnt to Determine the 
f Increased Equity. 
i[34 Alternatively, Richards argues that Br^wn 
enriched because while he paid half the 
all of the equity. He further contends that 
benefit is equal to half the equity earned 
with Brown. Richards bears the burden of e 
fact that equity was earned during the re 
the value of any unjust enrichment to Brown 
Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, H 13, l£ 
that the plaintiff prove each element of unj 
was unjustly 
Brown retained 
the value of that 
^luring his time living 
tablishing both the 
time period and 
See Desert Miriah, 
P.3d 580 (requiring 
ust enrichment). 
mortgage 
levant 
evi [^3 5 Our review of the record reveals no 
amount of equity in the home in May 1995, 
cohabiting with Brown, or in September 2005 
Indeed, the only appraisal entered into evi 
March 2008, two and one-half years after 
Brown's home. Although that appraisal cone 
was worth $425,000, it provides no informat 
value of the home was in 1995 and 2 005--the 
calculation of the change in equity during 
Ldence as to the 
when Richards began 
when he moved. 
tience was obtained in 
Richards moved out of 
iuded that the home 
(ion about what the 
dates needed for the 
he relevant period. 
i|3 6 Richards argues that this gap in the e 
by extrapolating from the 2008 appraisal, 
equity interest can be calculated by multiplying 
by 0.6 6 and then dividing that number in hat 
Richards, the 0.66 represents the proportion 
vidence can be filled 
He asserts that his 
the 2008 equity 
f. According to 
of Brown's total 
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ownership during which he resided in the home.14 Under this 
calculation, Richards asserts that he is entitled to over $91,000 
in damages.15 There are several problems with this approach. 
1(3 7 First, even if we were to adopt Richardsf s methodology, we 
would reject his 0.66 figure. Although Brown had owned the home 
for fifteen years when Richards relocated, she continued to own 
it at the time the 2008 appraisal was prepared. Thus, Richards's 
ten-year occupancy would need to be compared to the eighteen 
years Brown owned the property to calculate a percentage that is 
relevant to the equity existing in 2008. Using those numbers, 
Richards lived in the home with Brown for 55% of the time Brown 
owned it as of the time of the 2008 appraisal. 
i[3 8 Furthermore, Richards' s analysis relies on the assumption 
that equity rises at a constant rate that never falls or varies. 
However, home equity is not susceptible to a straight-line 
calculation. The equity in a home is directly related to the 
home's value at any given time. Home values are not stagnant, 
nor do they always increase. Consequently, the calculation of 
the increase or decrease in equity must be tailored to the 
specific time period at issue. Brown owned the house for five-
and-a-half years prior to and two-and-half-years after Richards's 
co-occupancy, during which time the value of the home could have 
rapidly appreciated. Where the evidence necessary to quantify 
any actual change in equity was absent from the record, the trial 
court was not required to adopt Richards's assumption of 
straight-line appreciation. Cf. Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, 
i[ 14, 131 P. 3d 252 (affirming trial court's exclusion of exhibit 
using straight-line method of calculation where proper measure of 
damages was the difference between the price of the stock on date 
of purchase and the price of the stock on date of sale). 
f39 In addition, Richards assumes that he paid 5 0% of the 
mortgage for the entire ten years he cohabited with Brown. The 
evidence does not support this assumption. In 1995, Richards 
paid $400 toward Brown's $1187 monthly mortgage payment. This 
equates to 34% of the mortgage. Even after Richards raised his 
monthly payment to $550, Brown's mortgage obligation was $1500. 
14Richards claims that Brown owned the home for fifteen 
years and he resided in her home for ten years. Ten divided by 
fifteen equals approximately 0.66. 
15The 2008 equity in Brown's home was $277,000. Richards 
claims the 1995 to 2005 equity can be calculated by multiplying 
$277,000 by 0.66, which equals $182,820. Because Richards 
believes he is entitled to half the equity, he divided $182,820 
by two to calculate his share as $91,410. 
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Thus, for that period, Richards made a 3 7% 
mortgage. In 2003, Brown's mortgage payment 
Richards was paying her $650. At that time 
Brown 43% of the monthly mortgage obligati 
acknowledge that the amount of the mortgage 
due to Brown's refinancing transactions, thi 
formula to determine the amount of any unju^ 
contribution to the 
was $1516 and 
Richards was paying 
While we 
fluctuated in part 
record contained no 
t enrichment. 
on 
1(4 0 Richards argues that the evidence is gcbod enough for a claim 
in equity. While we agree with Richards that "[u]njust 
enrichment must remain a flexible and workable doctrine," Jeffs 
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998), that flexibility does 
not excuse the plaintiff from establishing that, in fact, the 
defendant has been unjustly enriched in some calculable amount. 
For example, in Highland Construction Co. v Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), the supreme court 
affirmed the trial court's verdict of no cause of action where 
the plaintiff failed to quantify its damages. See id. at 1044, 
1052. The plaintiff had attempted to rely cpn a total costs 
theory of damages, arguing that it was entitled to its total 
expenditures on a construction job minus the amounts already 
received. See id. The trial court refused to admit the total 
costs evidence because it was not tied to any specific wrongful 
conduct of the defendants and the plaintiff provided no other 
evidence of damages at trial. See id. at lp45. Consequently, 
the trial court ruled against the plaintiff due to a failure of 
proof on damages. See id. 
f41 On appeal, the Highland Construction plaintiff argued that 
the damages should have been adequate for its causes of action, 
including a claim for quantum meruit. See id. The supreme court 
rejected this argument, stating, 
It is true that some degree of uncertainty in 
the evidence of damages will not relieve a 
defendant from recompensing a wronged 
plaintiff. However, it is also a general 
rule of long standing that a plaintiff must 
show damages by evidence of facts and not by 
mere conclusions, and that the items of 
damage must be established by substantial 
evidence and not by conjecture. 
Id. (citations omitted) . On the face of thjLs record, the trial 
ing to quantify the 
e. 
court did not exceed its discretion in refus 
benefit to Brown without substantial evident 
%42 Nor are we convinced that the decision^ from other 
jurisdictions upon which Richards relies hold otherwise. In 
Tolan v. Kimball, 33 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2001J (per curiam), the 
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Alaska Supreme Court, applying its standards for cohabiting 
couples, enforced the intent of the parties to share the equity 
in their residence equally. See id. at 1154-55. The court was 
able to determine the amount of that award, however, because 
there was evidence in the record that during the period of 
cohabitation, "the property's [net] value increased from $66,000 
to $168,000." Id. at 1153; see also Ulrich v. Zemke, 2002 WI App 
246, H1 4-6, 10, 258 Wis. 2d 180, KU 4-6, 10, 654 N.W.2d 458, 
%% 4-6, 10 (approving use of unjust enrichment theory to assess 
the rights of a formerly cohabiting couple where the record 
contained specific values for the various properties at issue 
during the relevant time period). 
143 Richards also relies on Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263 
(Colo. 2 0 00), wherein the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
fact of cohabitation does not bar a suit in equity. See id. at 
1269. In reaching that conclusion, the Salzman court cautioned, 
[C]ohabitation and sexual relations alone do 
not suspend contract and equity principles. 
We do caution, however, that mere 
cohabitation does not trigger any marital 
rights. A court should not decline to 
provide relief to parties in dispute merely 
because their dispute arose in relationship 
to cohabitation. Rather, the court should 
determine, as with any other parties, whether 
general contract laws and equitable rules 
apply. 
Id. at 1268-69 (footnote omitted); see also Flood v. Kalinvaprak, 
2004 MT 15, 1M( 20-21, 319 Mont. 280, %% 20-21, 84 P.3d 27, KK 20-
21 (rejecting divorce analysis and using partition action to 
divide property owned as tenants in common by unmarried former 
cohabitants). We see nothing in the cases cited by Richards that 
would have required the trial court to accept the damage theory 
advanced simply because Richards asserted equitable claims.16 
D. Brown Was Not Unjustly Enriched by Richards's Contributions 
to Routine Maintenance. 
f44 Richards also argues that Brown was unjustly enriched by his 
contributions to home maintenance during the time they cohabited. 
We disagree. The maintenance expenses did not materially benefit 
16Because we hold that the trial court did not exceed its 
discretion in finding that Richards did not quantify the value of 
any benefit to Brown, we need not address the other elements of 
unjust enrichment. 
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Brown by enhancing the overall value of the home. See Emergency 
Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, % 26, 
167 P.3d 1080 (noting that unjust enrichment requires that a 
defendant receive more than an incidental benefit). Furthermore, 
while maintenance was part of the necessary expense of occupying 
the home, the improvements paid for by Richards added to its 
future value. See generally Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 
389, 393 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (defining improvements as those 
that "add to the value of or enhance the marketability of the 
home" and maintenance as activities that are necessary for 
maintaining a home but do not enhance its overall value). Thus, 
Brown and Richards shared equally in the benefit from the 
maintenance expenses while living together in the home. In 
contrast, Brown continues to enjoy a benefit from the 
improvements long after Richards vacated the premises. We agree 
with the trial court that Brown has been unjustly enriched by the 
improvements but not by the routine maintenance expenses. 
III. Promissory Estoppel 
1[4 5 Richards argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
also entitles him to an interest in the home equity. Promissory 
estoppel is "employed where injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise." Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213, 
*h 22, 163 P. 3d 747. To make a claim of promissory estoppel, 
proof of four elements must be shown: 
(1) [Richards] acted with prudenc 
reasonable reliance on a promise 
[Brown]; (2) [Brown] knew that [R 
relied on the promise which [Browiji 
reasonably expect to induce action 
forbearance on the part of [Richards 
(3) [Brown] was aware of all matei 
and (4) [Richards] relied on the 
the reliance resulted in a loss t 
and in 
rjiade by 
chards] 
] should 
or 
] . . . ; 
ial facts; 
promise and 
[him] . 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, % 16, 158 P.3d 
1088 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
[^4 6 The trial court found that Brown, with knowledge of all 
material facts, made a promise to Richards to "treat him 
equitably," "that is, he would get an interest in his 
contribution to the home." However, the trial court concluded 
that Richards failed to meet his burden in proving the other two 
elements. First, the court said, "[Richards] has not shown he 
acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance . . . [on Brown's] 
promise [to add Richards to the title] " because Brown had twice 
refinanced the home without adding Richards s name to the title 
and Richards had never taken serious initiative to have his name 
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added. The trial court further concluded that even if Richards 
had reasonably relied, he did not show any detriment as a result 
of that reliance. Richards challenges both conclusions on 
appeal. 
1(47 Even if we were to assume that Richards's reliance on 
Brown's promise was reasonable, he still must prove damages to 
prevail on a claim of promissory estoppel. See Andreason v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
("An award of damages [on promissory estoppel] requires that a 
plaintiff prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of the 
evidence . . . . " ) . "Damages in promissory estoppel are limited 
to those which are sustained because the plaintiff[] ha[s] 
changed [his] position to [his] detriment in reasonable reliance 
upon the defendant's representation." Id. at 175. Generally, a 
promise binding under promissory estoppel is enforced by awarding 
the plaintiff his expectation damages. See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 90 cmt. d (1981) ("[F]ull scale enforcement by 
normal [contract] remedies is often appropriate.")/ id. § 347 
(stating that the general measure of damages for breach of 
contract is the expectation interest)/ see also Alta Health 
Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mech. Serv., 930 P.2d 280, 284-85 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) ("According to Utah contract law, . . . damages 
[for breach] are properly measured by the amount necessary to 
'place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the 
contract had been performed.'" (citation omitted)). Sometimes, 
the more equitable remedy under a theory of promissory estoppel 
is reliance damages, or damages to return the plaintiff to the 
position the plaintiff enjoyed before relying on the promise. 
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. d & illustrations 
(1981). The correct measure of damages in a particular case is a 
question of law. See Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, 1 23, 7 P.3d 
783. Accordingly, we consider whether Richards proved his 
damages under both the expectation and reliance measures. 
A. The Record Does Not Support an Award of Expectation Damages. 
14 8 If damages were calculated based on Richards's expectation, 
he would be entitled to the value of the promise made, that is, a 
fair interest in the equity. Due to the equitable nature of 
promissory estoppel, the calculation of damages may be more 
flexible than in typical contract cases. See Andreason, 848 P.2d 
at 175-76, 178 (requiring damages to be based on a "case by case 
calculation"). 
149 Despite the inherent flexibility in promissory estoppel 
cases, damages still must be proved "with reasonable certainty." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (1981). The amount of 
damages need not be established "with precision," Bastian v. 
King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983), but, at a minimum, 
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11
 [Richards must] prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of 
the evidence and the amount of damages by approximations and 
projections that rise above mere speculation," Andreason, 848 
P.2d at 176; accord 11 Corbin on Contracts § 56.16 (2005) ("In 
order to be entitled to . . . damages . . . , the plaintiff must 
lay a basis for a reasonable estimate of the extent of harm 
caused by the breach."). 
1(50 A brief review of the case law demonstrates this 
distinction. In Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 
P.2d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), for example, the court upheld an 
award of damages on the plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim. 
See id. at 178. There, the plaintiffs sued their insurance 
company for failing to pay for repairs that,the insurance company 
had instructed them to make. See id. at 173-74. At trial, the 
plaintiffs presented detailed evidence of the amount of damages 
by "meticulously testif[ying] from . . . personal written records 
of expenses," which detailed the costs associated with the 
specific items that, as instructed, the plaintiffs discarded and 
replaced rather than repaired. Id. at 176. This court held that 
the plaintiffs introduced "sufficient evidence to allow the 
[fact-finder] to determine an entitlement to promissory estoppel 
damages and to calculate their value." Id. (emphasis added). 
151 On the other hand, in Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d ft30 (Utah 1985), the 
ng the amount of 
c^ n his business's lost 
See id. at 336. 
of gross income only 
^mount of damages" and 
the fact that 
necessary for the 
s. See id. 
plaintiff failed to meet his burden of show 
damages where he only provided information 
gross income instead of its lost net income 
The supreme court held that " [p]roof of los 
is an insufficient foundation for proof of 
that, while the gross figures may have 
damages existed, the net income figures we 
court to approximate the actual amount of 
proven 
re 
damages 
f52 Here, as noted earlier, Richards introduced evidence as to 
the market value and equity that existed in the home in 2008, but 
the record contained no evidence of the equity at the time he 
moved into the home in 1995 or when he moved out in 2005. 
Without those parameters, it is impossible to determine the 
equity earned during the years Richards contributed to the 
mortgage. Even if the 2008 estimate of the home's value and 
equity had been sufficient to prove that damages actually 
occurred, it does not establish an appropriate measure of the 
amount of damages. See id. At best, the 2 008 estimate gave the 
trial court a gross value from which to begin. See id. But, as 
previously discussed, home values do not appreciate on a straight 
line, and they may even decrease. Therefore, without any 
evidence of the change in home equity from 1995 to 2 005, the 
trial court lacked the net value it needed ^o approximate or 
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calculate the amount of Richards's damages. Without that 
evidence, we cannot hold that the trial court exceeded its 
discretion in concluding that Richards did not establish the 
amount of expectation damages to which he would have been 
entitled. 
B. The Record Does Not Support an Award of Reliance Damages. 
1(53 Alternatively, if Richards were entitled to reliance 
damages, he would receive compensation sufficient to return him 
to the same position he would be in had he not relied upon 
Brown's promise. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 344, 
349 (1981) . Damages would be limited to the amount Richards 
expended in reliance on Brown's promise, less any loss that 
Richards would have avoided if Brown had fully performed her 
promise. See id. § 349; see also Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 848 P.2d 171, 176 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Damages in 
promissory estoppel are limited to those which are sustained 
because the plaintiff[] ha[s] changed [his] position to [his] 
detriment in reasonable reliance upon the defendant's 
representation."). In other words, Richards's compensation would 
equal the difference between what he paid on Brown's mortgage and 
what he would have paid to live somewhere else. As discussed 
above, the trial court compared the rental value of Brown's 
property and the home Richards rented after the parties ceased 
cohabiting and concluded that the amount Richards would have paid 
in rent over ten years was roughly equal to what he paid to 
Brown. 
i|54 Richards maintains that he is nevertheless entitled to any 
equity he would have earned had he used the $71,100 to purchase 
his own home instead of paying Brown. Richards might be entitled 
to that equity under a reliance theory upon an appropriate 
record. However, as the trial court held, Richards failed to 
meet his burden of providing the court with evidence sufficient 
to calculate how much that equity might be. There is no evidence 
in the record showing the value of any home Richards could 
purchase; what the total amount of that mortgage would be; what 
the interest rate, monthly payments, and other terms of such a 
mortgage would be; or any other facts that would show how much 
equity Richards could have earned under his own mortgage.17 As a 
result, the trial court lacked any figures that would have 
allowed it to approximate his reliance damages based on how much 
his hypothetical equity might be. See generally Andreason, 84 8 
P.2d at 176 (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of showing 
17The trial court would also have to assume that Richards 
would have actually purchased his own home if he had not relied 
on Brown's promise. 
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"the amount of damages by approximations and projections that 
rise above mere speculation"). Therefore, the trial court did 
not exceed its discretion in holding that Richards did not meet 
his burden of establishing his reliance damages. Thus, because 
Richards failed to prove either expectation or reliance damages, 
we agree with the trial court that he did npt establish a claim 
of promissory estoppel.18 
IV. Protective Order 
f55 Richards's final argument is that the trial court exceeded 
its discretion in granting the protective order that limited his 
ability to conduct discovery. The trial court granted the 
protective order for two reasons. First, "the discovery was 
propounded in violation of Utah [Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(d). ' 
Rule 26(d) prohibits a party from "seek[ing| discovery . . . 
before the parties have met and conferred as required by [Rule 
26(f)]." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d). Under rul^ 26(f), Richards's 
counsel was responsible for scheduling the meeting. See id. R. 
26(f). At the time Richards served Brown with his discovery 
requests, his counsel had neither met with Brown's counsel nor 
scheduled such a meeting. Further, even after the court's 
express directive to Richards's counsel to pubmit a scheduling 
order, counsel never did so. 
thi 
1)56 Second, the trial court noted that tri 
weeks away and that Richards had submitted 
Readiness for Trial one year earlier. In 
Richards's counsel stated, "Counsel has cornel 
Cf. McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 396 n.5 
(refusing to consider the plaintiff's argument 
survive summary judgment had the trial courp 
time to conduct discovery when the plainti 
filed two certificates indicating that all 
complete). Under the facts of this case, 
that the trial court exceeded its discreti 
protective order. Accordingly, we affirm 
1 was less than two 
Certificate of 
s certificate, 
eted all discovery.' 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
that he could 
allowed him more 
f had previously 
discovery was 
decline to conclude 
in granting the 
bn this issue. 
we 
on 
18Because we affirm the trial court's conclusion that 
Richards failed to prove damages, we need n<pt consider whether he 
reasonably relied on Brown's promise. 
19Nothing in this opinion, however, shoiild be interpreted to 
limit the trial court's discretion in allowing additional 
discovery on the unsolemnized marriage clairjn, if it determines 
such discovery is appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
ij57 An unsolemnized marriage requires that each of the five 
statutory elements be present. The plain language of the statute 
requires only that the couple have cohabited at some time. 
Consequently, termination of the section 30-1-4.5 relationship 
here may not have been coextensive with the date Richards moved 
out of Brown's home. Because there are material, disputed facts 
as to when the section 30-1-4.5 relationship terminated that must 
be resolved to determine whether Richards's claim is barred by 
the statute of repose, we reverse the trial court's entry of 
partial summary judgment. With respect to Richards's equitable 
claims, we affirm the trial court's ruling in favor of Brown 
because the record is inadequate to prove damages. Finally, we 
affirm the entry of the protective order. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
f58 WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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ISTRIC v. NORCON ELECS. , INC., 00146892 (5-J9-2005) 
2005 NY Slip Op 50677(D) 
PAUL ISTRIC, Plaintiff, v. NORCON ELECTRONICS, tNC, NORCON 
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., NORMAN SCHLAFF, GERRY SCHEER a^ nd SCOTT SCHEER, 
Defendant. 
00146892 
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings iCounty. 
Decided May 9, 2005. 
[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated fc}y the issuing court.) 
ARLENE P. BLUTH, J. 
Upon the foregoing cited papers and after argument, defendants 
move by Order to Show Cause to modify the income execution issued 
by plaintiff to delete therefrom the interest which has accrued 
since the judgment was entered against defendant on May 9, 1997. 
For the following reasons, defendants' motion is denied. 
In deciding this motion, the Court cannot consider trie 
opposition papers submitted by plaintiff, appearing prd se, as 
they are unsworn and therefore inadmissible. See Rebecahi v. 
Whitmore, 172 AD2d 600 [2nd Dept 1991] . Although his siibmission 
is presented as an affirmation, plaintiff does not allege that he 
is an attorney, doctor, dentist, or osteopath, whose affirmations 
are admissible under CPLR § 2106. 
While this case has a long history, for purposes of the instant 
dispute, the relevant facts, as outlined in defendants' moving 
papers, are as follows: On May 9, 1997, a judgment was entered 
for plaintiff against Gerry Scheer and Scott Scheer in the amount 
of $1,970 plus $225 in costs and disbursements, and $882.50 in 
interest from June 22, 1992, for a total judgment amoun|t of 
$3,077.50. 
On July 10, 1997, defendants' counsel wrote to plaintiff, who 
was and still is representing himself in this matter, ojffering to 
pay the full amount of the judgment in exchange for a 
"Satisfaction of Judgment in recordable form, as well ab a 
Release." Defendants' attorneys did not include these documents 
with that letter. On October 6, 1997, plaintiff served 
with a copy of the Judgment with Notice of Entry, with 
defendants 
EL note 
that included the following language: "I expect to receive from 
you the release papers and other papers to be sign [sic] by me in 
the near future, say two (2) weeks, otherwise I will be forced to 
execute the Judgment through the Sheriff's office." In response, 
defendants' counsel wrote to plaintiff on October 15, 1997 (more 
than five months after judgment had been entered), advising 
plaintiff that the firm was presently holding a check fpr 
$3,077.50 in escrow, ffr*l| and stating that "[p]ursuant to 
your letter of October 6, 1997, I have enclosed a Satis| 
Judgment and Release which need to be signed by you . 
receipt of these documents, I shall likewise hold them 
and immediately send you my attorney's check in payment 
Judgment amount." The enclosed Release was a sweeping dbcument 
releasing not only the judgment debtors Gerry Scheer anp Scott 
Scheer, but also the other named defendants, Norcon Ele 
Inc., Norcon Communications, Inc., and Norman Schaff 
paction of 
Upon my 
fin escrow 
of the 
ptronics, 
PfLaintiff 
never responded to defendants' October 1997 correspondence, and 
neither side followed up with the other 
Plaintiff did not send the Sheriff to execute on the judgment 
until more than seven years later. At oral argument, plaintiff 
contended that the delay was due to his inability to obtain a 
transcript of the judgment because the Court allegedly misplaced 
the file, a claim defendants dispute. In any event, the income 
execution served on defendants includes interest accrued on the 
judgment since the date of entry, May 9, 1997. Defendants' motion 
seeks to modify the income execution to delete therefrom all the 
interest that has accrued since October 15, 1997 the date of 
defendants' counsel's alleged second letter to plaintiff, which 
defendants contend was a tender. If interest did not stop, then 
as the date of this decision, May 9, 2005, the amount of interest 
from the date of the judgment to the date of the decision is 
$2,215.80 
A defendant's unconditional tender of the amount due on a 
judgment stops the running of postjudgment interest. See 
Meiselman v. Allstate Ins Co , 197 AD2d.561, 602 NYS2d 659 [2nd 
Dept 1993]. Defendants argue that their October 15, 1997 letter 
constituted such a "tender" to plaintiff, and thereby tolled the 
running of interest as of that date. Defendants' argument fails 
for several reasons 
First, defendants never actually sent the $3,077 50 to the 
plaintiff An offer to send payment is not equivalent to sending 
it. Since no money was sent, there was no tender. 
Second, even if the defendants had sent the check for $3,077 50 
to the plaintiff with their October 15th letter, it would not 
have been the full amount then due because more than five months 
of interest had already accrued on the judgment Interest on a 
money judgment begins to run from the date of its entry. See 
CPLR § 5003. Thus, plaintiff was entitled to the interest that 
had accrued since May 9, 1997, which is calculated at nine 
percent per year. See CPLR § 5004. To toll the running of 
interest, a tender must include the full amount due See 
Cafferty v Scotti Bros. Records, Inc., B$9 F Sypp 193/ 204-05 
[SDNY 1997]/ Gangen v Morrow, 303„AD2d 956, 757 „NYS2cf 422 
[4th Dept 2003] (tender was not unconditional because it did not 
include the interest, costs, and disbursements awarded by the 
court). Therefore, even if defendants had sent the check for 
$3,077 50, it would not have been sufficient 
Third, the tender was not unconditional, and therefore was 
ineffective to toll the running of interest. Defendants required 
plaintiff to properly execute and return two documents before 
they would pay the $3,077.50. The two documents, a satisfaction 
of judgment (or satisfaction piece) and a general release, serve 
different purposes, and each commands its own analysis 
A satisfaction piece is comparable to an official receipt; it 
is a statement acknowledging that the judgment has been satisfied 
(either wholly or partially). It is filed with the clerk of court 
and puts the world on notice that there is no longer an 
outstanding judgment. Although it is the judgment creditor's 
obligation to execute and file a satisfaction piece (CPLR § 
5020) , the risk of making the payment and not getting a 
satisfaction piece falls upon the judgment debtor. 
The CPLR contemplates that there may be times when a judgment 
debtor who has paid the judgment cannot get the satisfaction 
piece, and provides that the judgment debtor may bring on a 
motion pursuant to CPLR § SO21 for a court order satisfying the 
judgment (fully or partially) as of record. There are also 
consequences to a judgment creditor who refuses to issue a 
satisfaction piece (See CPLR § 5020) This Court understands that 
judgment debtors such as defendants herein would want to exchange 
the money for the satisfaction piece; the judgment creditor is 
obligated to give one anyway. However, if the judgment debtor 
chooses to not pay the judgment until he receives a satisfaction 
piece, then the interest will continue to accrue. 
The condition of a general release is another matter [entirely 
The judgment creditor has no obligation to execute a release, and 
it is inappropriate for the judgment debtor to demand the very 
broad protection ("from the beginning of the world to the date of 
this release") of a general release. Although parties often 
voluntarily exchange general releases in settlement, paying a 
judgment is not a settlement, and a plaintiff/judgment creditor 
would be well within his rights to refuse to generally release a 
judgment debtor.£fri2| Therefore, even if defendants had sent 
the correct amount of money to the plaintiff, the requirement of 
a satisfaction piece and a general release made the offler 
conditional, and did not toll the running of interest. 
Accordingly, defendants' motion is denied. 
This is the Decision and Order of the Court. 
Settlement 
[fnl] Exhibit H to the moving papers is a copy of the 
back of Norcon's check to its lawyers, indicating 
Judgement [sic] on Istric Case," for the full amount oti 
judgment, which was deposited in the attorneys' IOLA Aqcount 
ront and 
of 
the 
[fn2] The Court notes that the general release submitted by 
defendants included not only the two individual judgment debtors 
as releasees, but also three other entities' Such an averbroad 
condition would be yet another reason to deny defendants' 
motion. 
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Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 30 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Q CHAPTER 1 MARRIAGE 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be 
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it 
arises out of a contract between a man and a woman who: 
(a) are of legal age and capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this 
section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or with: 
one year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a 
marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and 
may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other 
cases. 
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Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rules of Civil Procedure 
PART I, SCOPE OF RULES - ONE FORM OF ACTION 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern thfe procedure in the courts 
of the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil 
nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special 
statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules promulgated by 
this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 
81. They shall be liberally construed to secure tfie just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effebt on January 1, 1950; and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or 
effect. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take 
effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except 
to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a 
particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible 
or would work injustice, in which event the formejt: procedure applies. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1987; November 1, 1&96; November 1, 1999; 
amended effective April 1, 2003; amended effective April 1, 2008.) 
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Rules of Civil Procedure 
d Rules of Civil Procedure 
d PART VII, JUDGMENT 
Rule 58A. Entry of Judgment; Abstract 
of Judgment. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to Rule 54(b), the clerk shall promptly sign and file 
the judgment upon the verdict of a jury. If there is a special verdict or a 
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a 
jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate judgment 
which the clerk shall prompltly sign and file. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) 
and Rule 55(b)(1), all judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed 
with the clerk, 
(c) When judgment entered; recording.. A judgment is complete and 
shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on 
real property, when it is signed and filed as provided in subdivisions (a) 
or (b). The clerk shall immediately record the judgment in the register 
of actions and the register of judgments. 
(d) Notice of judgment. A copy of the signed judgment shall be 
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 
5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by this 
requirement. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may 
nevertheless entered. 
(f) Judgment by confession. If a judgment by confession is 
authorized by statute, the party seeking the judgment must file with the 
clerk a statement, verified by the defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment is for money due or to become due, it shall concisely 
state the claim and that the specified sum is due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment is for the purpose of securing the plaintiff 
against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the specified sum does not exceed the liability; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for the specified sum. 
The clerk shall sign and file the judgment for the specified sum, with 
costs of entry, if any, and record it in the register of actions and the 
register of judgments. 
(g) Abstract of Judgment. The clerk may abstract a judgment by 
a signed writing under seal of the court that: 
(1) Identifies the court, the case name, the case number, the judge or 
clerk that signed the judgment, the date the judgment was signed, and the 
date the judgment was recorded in the registry oif actions and the registry 
of judgments; 
(2) states whether the time for appeal has passed and whether an appeal 
has been filed; 
(3) states whether the judgment has been stayecjl and when the stay will 
expire; and 
(4) if the language of the judgment is known to the clerk, quotes 
verbatim the operative language of the judgment or attaches a copy of 
the judgment. 
(Amended effective September 4, 1985; January 1, 1987; November 1, 1997; 
effective Novmeber 1, 2009.) 
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